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Dignity of Human Beings – Dignity of Animal Beings
A Case Study: Bulls as Gladiators1
BÉL A MESTER
A frequented instance of the recent discourse on the animal rights is the 
topic of bull fi ghts. Th e aim of my contribution is to off er an analysis of a 
similar debate on bull fi ghts one hundred years ago, in Budapest. In the be-
ginning of the 20th century several “road shows of Spanish toreros” had been 
organized in Central Europe, off ering an opportunity to meet the new needs 
of mass entertainment and the idea of animal rights. By my analysis, the 
argumentation for animal rights in these debates was based on an analogy 
between the “dignity of the animal beings” and he “dignity of the human 
beings”, rooted in a naturalised anthropology of the late Continental posi-
tivism. At the end of my paper, I will mention a parallelism between this old 
philosophical background and the new concept of embodied mind.
Introduction: Bullfi ght as a Model
An emblematic example of the contemporary discourse on animal rights and animal 
welfare is the debate on the permission or prohibition of bullfi ghts. It manifests a simple 
situation of the immoral abuse of animals’ lives, without any modifying element, such 
as a strong economic interests in human welfare or the politics of world-nutrition. Th e 
question of bullfi ghts seems to be a clear model of a pure ethical problem, in which 
the practical consequences are insignifi cant. Seemingly, the single sensitive question 
is the cultural embeddedness of bullfi ghts in several societies and the resulting possi-
bility of misunderstanding in intercultural discourses on several phenomena. In what 
follows I rarely touch on the cultural embeddedness of the analysed phenomenon. It 
is to be noted that before the economic crisis, especially in the ’90s, the plan was to 
organise European road-shows of bullfi ghts as parts of the global mass-entertainment. 
My analysis is focussed on this globalised form of bullfi ghts, in the mirror of the large 
discourse on a similar situation, namely the real bullfi ghts in Budapest more than a 
century ago, in the year of 1904. In the following part of my article I outline the events 
1 For this paper I have used the ideas presented at my lectures in Th e Lošinj Days of Bioethics, 2011, 
Croatia; and at the conference “Living with Consequences 2011”, Koper, Slovenia, 2011. Th e present article 
is a part of a research program entitled “Narratives of the History of Hungarian Philosophy (1792–1947),” 
supported by the Hungarian Scientifi c Research Found (OTKA K 104643).
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of the early bullfi ghts and their aft erlife in cultural memory. Following that, I off er an 
analysis of the argumentation of the pro-animal movement of the time, and its back-
ground in the philosophy as well as other fi elds of culture of the same epoch. Finally, 
in the last part of my paper, I draw parallels between the philosophical background of 
the discourse that surrounded these phenomena one hundred years ago, and a relevant 
trend of our contemporary philosophical discourse, with regards to their consequenc-
es for animal rights.
Budapest Corridas in 1904 and Th eir Cultural Memory
Th ere is a well-known comic scene of the classical genre of ‘Budapest Cabaret,’ with 
an elderly husband who can see only one escape from the trap of his awful marriage: 
to apply for the job of a ‘volunteer torero’ of the next ‘Budapest Corrida.’ However, 
today’s Hungarian audience regards this classic scene as a standard of the ‘comedy of 
a married couple,’ with grotesque, irrational elements; an elderly downtown citizen in 
the role of a real torero, the ‘arena of bulls’ as a real place in Budapest. However, origi-
nally these elements made the gist of the story. Th e wife of our ‘volunteer torero’ was a 
chairperson of a local pro-animal society in the fi ction of cabaret, and the fi rst problem 
of the non-fi ctional public sphere of the time was the evaluation of the corridas as the 
newest form of mass-entertainment in Budapest. In this period, all the great European 
cities had guest-toreros and “guest-bulls” for several pilot-corridas. Bullfi ght, having 
been a local tradition before, had tried to fi nd its place and role in the new structure of 
globalized mass-entertainment. Th e case of Budapest was special in an international 
context, because in Budapest a permanent ‘arena of bulls’ had been built in a sym-
bolic societal space; in the middle of the City Park, in the centre of the triangle of 
the Amusement Park, the Hippodrome, and the Budapest Zoo. Aft er establishing this 
institution at this symbolic place, and successfully acculturating the bullfi ghts into the 
new mass-entertainment of the city, Budapest was able to become the centre of the 
(never established) Central European bullfi ght-industry.
On the surface, the discourse about the bullfi ghts followed the trend of contempo-
rary Hungarian politics. Th e non-governmental organisations founded especially for 
touristic and cultural reasons were active in this regard, partially promoting and par-
tially opposing the bullfi ghts, using mainly nationalistic slogans. (Typical topics in the 
newspapers were the emphasis put on ‘Spanish barbarism’ and the contrast between 
the bull with a typical Hungarian bull-name and the torero with a typical Spanish 
name.) In the beginning, the government’s attitude was ambiguous. At fi rst, bullfi ghts 
were permitted, albeit only in the ‘French style’ (without killing the bull) – with toreros 
educated in Spanish corridas. Almost every new event in the arena, or even a street 
scandal, off ered an opportunity to change the offi  cial rules. Finally, the government 
DIGNIT Y OF HUMAN BEINGS – DIGNIT Y OF ANIMAL BEINGS  ¨  153
prohibited the bullfi ghts, and the globalized mass-entertainment in Budapest focused 
on other topics2. Th e local press was mostly on the side of prohibition, and took the 
opportunity to present an analogy between the barbarism of the old animal battles 
in the eighteenth century and the new project3. Twenty years later, the next and last 
appearance of a Spanish bullfi ght road show was not in the focus of the public sphere. 
Corridas were only permitted in suburbs, outside the territory of the local authorities 
of Budapest, without sensational circumstances. In the press a periodical associated 
with the pro-animal movements published a signifi cant refl ection on the topic4, using 
the old clichés of the barbarism of bullfi ghts and evaluated the new event as insignif-
icant in comparison with the fi rst Budapest bullfi ghts. In the cultural memory of the 
Hungarian pro-animal movement the debate in 1904 was signifi cant and triumphant, 
while the present one in the twenties was evaluated only as a boring shadow of the 
past. Th e prohibition of animal battles was considered to be an evident thesis, not wor-
thy of a single new or special argument concerning the animal–human relationship.
Th e stereotype of the “protection of animals in the civilized Budapest,” versus 
the “barbarism of the bullfi ghting nations” was rooted in the role of the pro-animal 
movements in the Hungarian fi n de siècle society. Written sources on the early history 
of Central European, and especially Hungarian, animal protection movements have 
convinced us that it had a double embeddedness, both in the bureaucratic elite of the 
new institutions of the late nineteenth-century modernization, and in the institutions 
of the new disciplines of biological studies. Th e commander of the Budapest Police5, 
a representative of the staff  of the Budapest Zoo6, and the founder of Hungarian orni-
thology, Ottó Hermann were all active and distinguished members of the societies for 
animal protection. As a consequence, these societies were closely connected with gov-
ernmental practice such as the rules of the local authorities concerning urban animals 
and animal fairs, circular letters for the schoolteachers of natural history, and so on. 
Th eir relationship with the sciences is important in understanding the pro-scientifi c 
position of the movement; its criticism of the wrong, non-enlightened traditions of 
everyday life was based on scientifi c data. An institutionalized, technologically and 
scientifi cally grounded, twofold utilitarianism has emerged as the dominant discourse, 
conisting of the utility of the animals for humanity on its fi rst level, and a calculus of 
utility concerning the welfare, pleasure and pain of the animals on its second. To be a 
2 For the events and political circumstances of the early Budapest corridas see Vari 2010.
3 For the most typical refl ections in the local press, see Takáts 1905; Vay 1904.
4 See Gelsei Bíró 1925.
5 Boldizsár Bornemissza, chief commander of the Budapest Police was the Honorary President of the 
Hungarian animal protection movement. His death on the 25th of August, 1905 was in the headlines of the 
press of the pro-animal movement in Hungary.
6 József Kukuljevič, as a representative of the management of the Budapest Zoo, was the chief editor of the 
central periodical of the Hungarian pro-animal movement.
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moral subject in the above mentioned bureaucratic discourse is interpreted as being 
the subject of law. A paradigmatic consequence of this idea is the aspiration to broad-
en the Geneva Convention to include the “animal warriors,” especially the horses and 
dogs employed in the armies. Th e vocabulary of the movement was rich in metaphors 
taken from human professions: animals oft en appeared as workers, employees, or pro-
ducers of goods in this discourse.
At this point, the need has emerged of a new ground for argumentation. For avoid-
ing the superfl uous pain of every living being is enough to regard them as sensitive 
entities, but a description of animals as beings functioning in quasi-societal roles re-
quires another concept of the animal phenomenon. Th is concept had been off ered by 
a system of ideas about animal rationality and emotions, and a language devoid of the 
distinction between the human and animal physiological functions. All the important 
features of these discourses emerged together in a concise form in 1904 in the debates 
on Spanish bullfi ght, the new kind of mass-entertainment in Budapest. While the ar-
ticles against the bullfi ghts were published in the special periodicals of the pro-animal 
movement and did not interact with the mainstream discourse which rather used the 
stereotype of “Spanish barbarism;” still, the actions and opinions of the movement 
had a signifi cant social eff ect7. At this time, within the pro-animal press, a new idea 
emerged, based mostly on the known opinions on avoiding the pain of both humans 
and animals, which took into consideration the personality or dignity of the bulls. In a 
system of ideas that regards the tasks of urban animals as quasi-societal roles, a profes-
sional fi ghting bull is a societal disfunction and a culturally alien phenomena, like that 
of a gladiator. Th is discourse evaporated with the crisis of World War I, and it has nev-
er been reconstructed in its former, complex form. Th e above mentioned pro-animal 
article about the bullfi ghts from the ’20s remembers the triumph “over the barbarism 
of bullfi ghts,” but has forgotten the argumentation of the debate.
A New Concept of Animals
In the following I describe the main elements of this new frame of ideas about ani-
mals based on a typical text from the theoretical literature of the Hungarian pro-an-
imal movement of the turn of the century. Th e fi rst step is to distinguish it from the 
mainstream utilitarian argumentation of the animal protection movement of the time, 
mirrored in the other articles of the same periodical: “educated people know that the 
7 Actually, we cannot speak about a unifi ed organisation. Th e Hungarian pro-animal movement at this 
time was highly diversifi ed. Almost every signifi cant town had an independent pro-animal group, typically 
with the participation of the local intelligentsia, and with the active collaboration of the local teacher of na-
tural history. Th e national-level organisation was only established in a relatively late period of the movement, 
and it has functioned as a federation of independent societies.
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animals are worthy of good treatment not only because of their utility, but because 
they are sensitive and understanding beings as well8.” Th e thesis of animal reason has 
an important eff ect on the concept of human reason as well, and destroys the dichoto-
my between human and animal mental capacities. Th ere is no strict diff erence between 
(animal) instinct and (human) reason, both being based on the same processes of tam-
ing and training. Th e structure of the reason of a tamed and trained animal, living in a 
cultural environment, is similar to that of a human, because the humans under cultural 
conditions are tamed and trained animals, formed by their own culture. Both animal 
and human reasoning are based on the common capacity of imitation. Th e emphasis 
in both human and animal cases is placed on the role of imitation in establishing soci-
eties, concluding in an utterance about the “(animal) capacity of civilisation.” Th e con-
sequent style of the author, using ‘he,’ or ‘she’ instead of ‘it to refer to animals, is a nat-
ural consequence of the principles. We can see in the vocabulary and scientifi c context 
that this new concept of animals is not a naïve romantic analogue but an element of a 
new worldview. Th e article mentioned above had off ered a systematized epitome of the 
most widespread ideas amongst the pro-animal movement9. Th is highly socialized, 
maybe humanized concept of animals is the root of the idea of animal rights based on 
a concept of “animal dignity,” similar to that of humans. Th is socialized animal, e.g. a 
bull, not only has the rights to avoid pain and suff ering, but to avoid participating in 
humiliating actions (e.g. in bullfi ghts) as well.
A Possible Philosophical Root of the New Image of Animals
Th e above described, typical example of the theoretical thinking of the pro-animal 
movement of the era was not separated from the intellectual life of the epoch. It was 
not only embedded in sciences but in philosophy as well. My historical example for 
the connection between pro-animal theory and contemporary mainstream philoso-
phy outlines a characteristic anthropology. It was, however, rooted in fi n de siècle pos-
itivism; its development is not typical. Mainstream Hungarian philosophical thinking, 
in accordance with the trends of Continental thinking, had departed from positivism, 
and was more in line with neo-Kantian tendencies, and later, with the diff erent schools 
8 Reisz 1905. Th e article is an edited version of a lecture of the author, Irén Reisz, a teacher of natural his-
tory, read in the presence of the general assembly of the Animal Protection Society of Baja, a little town on 
the right bank of the Danube.
9 However, at the same time there were other initiatives for the popularization of the idea of animal pro-
tection, especially in the fi eld of education; that used the known theories instrumentally. For instance, there 
are known appeals of the pro-animal movement for teaching the elements of animal rights in the frame of the 
organized religious education in schools. Th ese appeals have never been rooted in the theological thinking 
of a Christian pro-animal group of any denomination; they were always the opinions of a laic movement, 
communicated towards the clergy.
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of neo-idealism. Th e author discussed below demonstrated a reciprocal intellectual 
development. In the beginning, he focused on topics of neo-Kantianism, like the prob-
lem of the category of time, and later, he took up the positivistic point of view during 
his investigations. He was a consequent critic both of the old-fashioned materialism of 
Karl Vogt and Ludwig Büchner, and of the contemporary idealism, and his close con-
nection with the new data of experimental psychology made his ideas acceptable in the 
public opinion of his period, which was mainly based on the sciences. In this chapter 
of my paper I show that this system of ideas with its anthropological consequenc-
es is useful in a pro-animal argumentation, including an explicit argumentation for 
the parallelism of animal and human reasons and personalities of the era mentioned 
above. Finally, I show that his anthropology and the above mentioned argumentation 
of the animal protection movement went hand in hand.
In the following I refer to the texts of a Hungarian author of late positivism, Jenő 
Posch (1859–1923), a recognised ancestor of international behaviourism10. I use these 
texts as instances off ering a good opportunity for the comparison of several elements 
of his philosophical vocabulary and the vocabulary of his contemporaries in the Hun-
garian animal protection movement. Th e fi rst remarkable idea is a systematic an-
ti-metaphysical cleansing of the vocabulary of the theory of mind11. For him, the use 
of the words ‘soul’ and ‘mind’ is similar to the use of the word ‘cholera’.. Th e illness 
called cholera is not caused by the black bile (in Greek: cholē), like in the theory of 
Hippocrates, but the word is still used as a neutral sign of this illness, without prob-
lems of interpretation. Likewise, there is no substantial soul or mind as a separate and 
pre-existent cause of the mental phenomena, we use these old words only as a neutral 
sign of a group of special phenomena, called mental. Th e cleansing of the language 
was expanded to include the vocabulary of the recent materialism of Karl Vogt, whose 
famous example had been unmasked as an unconscious requisite of the old metaphys-
ical vocabulary. For Vogt, to suppose the existence of the soul is similar to suppose the 
existence of a ‘spirit of kidneys.’ (Urine is the product of kidneys without a ‘special spir-
it of kidneys,’ and the thought is the product of the brain without a phenomenon called 
the ‘mind.’) By the critique of Posch, this Vogtian localisation of the thought in the 
body is just a requisite of dualism, which upholds the existence of the thought as a sep-
arate entity, and not a bodily function12. Th e insuffi  cient character of Vogtian materi-
10 Researches of the fi rst American behaviourists and Posch ran in parallel, although the achievements of 
Posch were available in the international scene aft er World War I, with a concise explanation of his ideas 
in German. See Posch 1923. Posch later became part of the historiographical canon of behaviourism; Mc-
Guigan 1978.
11 Th e author’s opinions about the critique of language are connected to those of Mauthner. An interpreta-
tion of their relationship is the future task of the history of philosophy, especially considering their corres-
pondence.
12 For the topics mentioned see in his masterpiece, passim: Posch 1915.
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alism inspired him to call his own system ‘realism,’ as a theoretically more consequent 
form of old materialisms. Th e central position of the critique of language, and the aim 
of his researches, was to off er a new, complex anthropology and keep it in the realm of 
philosophy, in spite of his close connection to the experimental sciences (his writings 
were published in periodicals of philosophy.) In the system of Posch, mental phenom-
ena evaporated amongst the events of the (potentially or actually) acting bodies. His 
system was not based on “thinking bodies” alone, but in a more radical manner, on the 
identifi cation of thinking with physical acting. In the style of the author, his theses did 
not include any humiliation of the human being; on the contrary, he expresses them 
with a kind of pathos characteristic of the Enlightenment. It seems that in these theses 
he found the answer for the question of his early Kantianism (“what is the human”).
Posch’s ideas had partly been developed in individual articles since the last years 
of the nineteenth century, and the outlines of the system were fi nished by 1910; the 
whole work was published as late as the second year of World War I. Its reception is 
not separable from the cultural shock of the war period. For the illustration of the 
cultural plausibility of this new anthropology, I refer to the short stories and novels of 
a well-known Hungarian writer, Frigyes Karinthy, written in the war- and post-war 
years13. Karinthy’s stories in this period are abundant in fantastic elements, connected 
to the phenomenon of changeable personalities; in the simplest form it is the idea of 
changeable bodies under conditions of the newly invented scientifi c method of con-
scious reincarnation. All the stories have similar, tragic ends, as the main character, 
who should not be connected to a pseudo-being of ‘soul,’ full of false ideas and the-
ories, misinterprets the concept of identity,. In the fi nal scenes it becomes clear that 
human personal identity can only exist in the human body; failing to respect this fact 
one of the characters discovers the inability to make love with a borrowed body as a 
simple tool, another can really feel his self-identity only on the occasion of his hanging. 
Paraphrasing Foucault’s thought, we see here scenes where the human bodies try to 
escape from the prison of soul, but it is too late for the human persons to survive.
Aft er this culturally interiorised anthropological turn, Posch explicitly formulated 
the consequences of his philosophy regarding animals. From the point of view of his 
system, the integration of a new theory of animals into a radical conception of act-
ing bodies can fi nd its place in the interpretation of thinking and the critique of the 
metaphysical language. In this analysis he judges the diff erences between the animal 
and human physiological functions in ordinary languages to be a meaningless req-
uisite of a failed metaphysics, just like the words ‘soul,’ ’spirit’ and ‘mind’ were in the 
above mentioned texts. A normative distinction between the perished animal and a 
13 Th ese writings of Karinthy have a large interpretative literature in Hungarian humanities; I for now 
choose, however, disregard the refl ections on them. Th e supposed parallelism between Posch’s philosophy 
and Karinthy’s fi ctions is my own hypothesis.
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dead human being, an eating person and her devouring pet, or referring to a human as 
‘he,’ or ‘she,’ and to an animal as ‘it,’ are mere linguistic phenomena, rooted in the lan-
guage-use of the epoch. Th is pro-animal argumentation was published on the pages of 
the most infl uential Hungarian literary review, as a practical conclusion of the summa-
rized philosophical opinions of the author, published in his books and his articles in 
serious periodicals for scholars14. From our present point of view, it appears only as an 
interesting particularity of the history of philosophy, without any of the above detailed 
parallelism with the vocabulary of the animal protection movement of the same era. A 
historiographer, aft er reconstructing these analogous structures, must observe that the 
arguments for animal rights on a philosophical basis had unfortunately disappeared in 
the ’20s of the last century. Th e cultural plausibility of the above quoted theories evap-
orated in the darkness of the intellectual history of the interwar Continental Europe.
Epilogue: Remarks on a Contemporary Th eory
Every argument for animal rights or welfare – or at least, for the smallest amount of 
suff ering for animals – has an inevitable, either explicit or hidden, anthropological 
aspect. We can express this question in the concept of the diff erence and similarity of 
the animal and the human personality, the animal and the human nature. Th e history 
of Western philosophy is abundant in relevant pro and contra arguments, especially in 
the fi eld of moral philosophy; both the supposed uniqueness of humankind and the 
requirement of animal–human brotherhood are fundaments of widespread systems of 
moral opinions. Th e initial topic of my present approach was based on a recent con-
cept of the philosophy of mind called the ’embodied mind’. According to my hypothe-
sis, the opinions in philosophy of mind connected to this term are able to establish an 
argument for animal rights based on the similarity of the human and the animal body–
mind structure, both historically, as detailed above, and synchronically, as follows.
At the end of the last century a new concepet emerged simultaneously in the dif-
ferent discourses of epistemology: ‘embodied mind.’ According to the opinions of the 
most enthusiastic supporters of the theories based on this term, it has the potential 
to be a fundamental challenge and the turning point of Western thought concerning 
crucial questions of philosophical anthropology. One of the most infl uential books of 
these theories, written by Lakoff  and Johnson, formulates the question rhetorically in 
its initial chapter: “Who Are We?” (Lakoff  and Johnson 1999). Th is text off ers a list of 
the ideas of the European intellectual heritage that their novel theory exceeds. One of 
the most important utterances concerns the relationship between animals and humans: 
14 See Posch 1924. For the animal–human relationship, see especially Chapter IV. Th is posthumous writing 
can be regarded as his “intellectual last will and testament.”
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“Th e discovery that reason is evolutionary utterly changes our relation to other animals 
and changes our conception of human beings as uniquely rational. Reason is thus not 
an essence that separates us from other animals; rather, it places us on a continuum 
with them.” (Lakoff  and Johnson 1999. 4.) Th e emphasis is, of course, on the rejection 
of the Cartesian dualism. Th e list of the theses of “the changes of our understanding of 
reason” is followed by another list of the failed theories from Descartes through Kant to 
Chomsky. However, these are theories of the mind only prima facie, on a closer reading 
it turns out to be a list of the main anthropological opinions of Western philosophy. 
Based on the fi rst thesis of this list – “there is no Cartesian dualistic person” –, and aft er 
the declaration of the human–animal continuum, we presume that the next statement 
must be the enlargement of the concept of ‘person’ to include animals, or at least, some 
argument against this enlargement. Later, the authors off er large systematic chapters 
on “the cognitive science of basic philosophical ideas,” i. e. about morality. Based on 
the initial promises of the book the reader expects an enlargement of the sphere of the 
moral beings or subjects to include animals, or at least a reasoning for the exclusion of 
animals from the moral sphere. Surprisingly, we cannot fi nd any such statement, and 
aft er the fi rst pages the reader must say “goodbye to animals” forever.
Th is forgetting of animals is rooted in several structural elements of the early theo-
ries of ‘embodied mind.’ In what follows I briefl y outline a highly simplifi ed model of a 
large, vivid and interesting fi eld of recent research. I think it holds true only for the ear-
ly theories; and only from the point of view of animal protection. In the new theory the 
words ‘body’ or ‘fl esh’ refer to the neural networks and sensitive apparatus, sometimes 
in almost the same way that ‘brain’ does, instead of the whole of the fl esh. A vocabulary 
built on this special point of view of the ‘body’ can function in a theoretical discourse 
as a material reduplication of the dualistic theories that are considered old-fashioned. 
However, the judgements about the things and processes are radically new; the struc-
ture of this New World is almost the same as that of the old one was. It is true that the 
body–mind dualism and the separated person as an agent of sensation and action are 
theoretically denied, but the texts always speak about the new epistemological and 
moral roles of ‘persons,’ and new concepts and roles of ‘minds.’ It seems to be like old 
actors in an old play of an old theatre, only with a new director – the tradition will re-
organize the old dramaturgic machinery against the will and the new point of view of 
the new director. Th e semantic structure of the key words – ‘embodied mind,’ ‘disem-
bodied mind,’ ‘embodiment,’ and ‘disembodiment,’ in French: ‘incarnation’ – supports 
the tendency of this hidden dualistic discourse with the clear theological connotation 
of the vocabulary. Body–mind dualism is encoded in this vocabulary, despite of the 
monistic intention of the speaker. Ironically, an argumentation against the pre-exist-
ent mind and the separation of body and mind should express it by using the terms 
of the separate, pure mind and body. (Recently, as a member of the editorial board 
of the Hungarian Review of Philosophy, I encountered the question as a problem of 
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translation and the appropriate standardized use of terms like ‘embodiment,’ ‘embod-
ied mind,’ in Hungarian, by diff erent authors15. Finally, instead of the word by word 
translation it became ‘bodily mind,’ but the most radical, and clear formulation was the 
‘thinking body,’ without a separate mind.) Conclusively, we have seen a great promise 
for rethinking the relationship between animals and humans within the framework of 
a recent theory in the philosophy of mind, that proved unfulfi lled because of its old 
vocabulary, and the unconscious use of the terms of this vocabulary. It seems like the 
philosophers have forgotten the results of the old linguistic turn by the new ‘mentalist’ 
turn. Th e case may be that philosophical theories, like a human eye, must always have 
a blind spot.
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